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RECENT DECISIONS
ON NONRESIDENT MOTORISTCIVIL PROCEDURE -SERVICE
STATUTE PROVIDING FOR SUBSTITUTED SERVICE NOT APPLICABLE To
ACTION FOR SERVICES ARISING FROIm COLLISION ON STATE HIGHWAY. - Aldrich v. Johns, 93 Ga. App. 787, 92 S.E.2d 804 (1956).
Defendant was sued in Georgia for professional medical services

rendered to two employees of defendant, a nonresident truck
owner, for injuries sustained in a collision on a state highway.
Plaintiff was assignee of accounts of certain physicians who treated defendant's employees. Service of process was made upon the
Secretary of State, pursuant to the Georgia Nonresident Motorist
Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 68-801 (Supp. 1955), which applies to actions

allegedly arising out of:
... any accident or collision in which any such nonresident user
may be involved by reason of the operation by him, for him, or
under his control or direction, express or implied, of a motor vehicle
on any such highways, streets, or public roads in said State...

The trial court sustained a general demurrer to the petition. On
appeal the court affirmed, holding that the nonresident motorist
act applies only to tort claims; substituted service under such act
does not provide jurisdiction over the nonresident for recovery of
medical services rendered.
Nonresident motorist statutes are an example of the continuing
trend of the courts away from the rule first enunciated in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), that jurisdiction for actions in
personam is based upon the physical power of the state over the
individual. At the present time, the emphasis is placed upon the
concept of notice to the defendant sufficient to satisfy "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The nonresident motorist
statutes indicate the extent to which legislatures have gone in expanding the jurisdiction of state courts over litigation based on
activities within the state. Following the trend toward expansion
of state jurisdiction, the Supreme Court first upheld the constitutionality of these statutes in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927),
reasoning that the automobile is a dangerous instrumentality and
that the statute does not deprive the nonresident of due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather, puts the nonresident on equal footing with the resident. However, the statutory
scheme must provide for reasonable attempts to notify the nonresident. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
The great diversity of actions that can arise out of an auto accident creates a growing problem of determining what causes of action are comprehended by nonresident motorist statutes. In the
(328)
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usual case of the nonresident tort-feasor being sued by the injured
resident, casual connection between the accident and the injury
seems to be the prime consideration. In Lindsay v. Short, 210 N.C.
287, 186 S.E. 239 (1936), an action for abuse of process for having
the plaintiff arrested after the accident, was held to be too remote
to be within the statute. But where third parties are concerned, as
in the instant case, substituted service is often sought in suits involving statutory and contractual obligations as well as tort liabilities. Despite the fact that the broad language of the Georgia statute includes "any accident or collision" by which "any action"
arises, the Georgia Court of Appeals limited the nonresident's
liability to tort claims only.
Other jurisdictions, with statutory provisions similarly broad,
have held such service valid as to statutory and contractual causes
of action. In a suit under a workmen's compensation act, Maddry
v. Moore Bros. Lumber Co., 195 La. 979, 197 So. 651 (1940), the
Louisiana Supreme Court upheld substituted service under the
Louisiana Nonresident Motorist Statute by the injured employee
upon his nonresident employer, stating at 197 So. 652: "[I]t would
appear that it was the intention of the Legislature to embrace actions of any and every nature growing out of an accident or collision .... ." Substituted service on nonresident motorists in actions
for wrongful death have been permitted, whether based upon a
survival statute, as in Hunt v. Noll, 112 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1940),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 690 (1941), or a wrongful death statute
which creates a new cause of action, Wynn v. Robinson, 216 N.C.
347, 4 S.E.2d 884 (1939).
In Sout'heastern Greyhound Lines v. Myers, 288 Ky. 337, 156
S.W.2d 161 (1941), the Kentucky court allowed substituted service in an action for contribution brought by the bus company
against the nonresident truck owner, holding that although the
right of action based upon implied contract was given only by the
contribution statute, substituted service was permitted since the
operative facts arose out of the collision. The Kentucky Nonresident Motorist Statute, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 188.020 (Baldwin
1955), is in all respects similar to that in the instant case. Subrogation of the right to contribution was also permitted in McKay v.
Citizens Rapid Transit Co., 190 Va. 851, 59 S.E.2d 121 (1950), under a similar statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 8-67.1 (1950).
A recent interpretation of a nonresident motorist statute to include a contractual claim was made in DartTransit Co. v. Wiggins,
1 Ill. App. 2d 126, 117 N.E.2d 314 (1953), where the court, in construing the Illinois statute, ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 95Y § 23 (SmithHurd 1950), allowed a suit for indemnity, stating that the statute
is not limited to actions ex delicto.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Vol. XXXHI

The court in the instant case construed the statute strictly since
it was in derogation of common law; however, the decisions contrary to the instant case interpret the nonresident motorist statute
as essentially a remedial measure and give it a correspondingly
broad construction. Jones v. Pebler, 371 Ill. 309, 20 N.E.2d 592
(1939). This latter interpretation is correct, being in conformity
with the underlying policy of the law to broaden the scope of in
personam jurisdiction.
A further and perhaps more important basis for the decision in
the instant case is the limitation imposed by the consent theory. At
92 S.E.2d 806, the court stated, "[B]y using Georgia Highways he
[defendant] consents to be sued in Georgia on causes of action
arising from an alleged tort liability incurred by his use of the
highways," (Emphasis added), and cited Pennoyer v. Neff, supra,
as authority for that proposition. While it is true that the constitutionality of these statutes has in the past been based on the fiction of "impliedly consenting" to the appointment of a designated
state official for service of process due to the nonresident's use of
the state highways, a contrary rationale was recently expressed
by Mr. Justice Franldurter:
...[T]here has been some fictive talk to the effect that the reason
why a non-resident can be subjected to a state's jurisdiction is
that the non-resident has 'impliedly' consented to be sued there.
In point of fact, however, jurisdiction in these cases does not rest
on consent at all ....
The liability rests on the inroad which the
automobile has made on the decision of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
as it has on so many aspects of our social scene. Olberding v. Illinois
Central R.R., 346 U. S. 338 at 341 (1953).

In view of the foregoing, the reliance by the Georgia court upon
the "consent" of the defendant does not appear to be in conformity
with the present trend of judicial opinion.
Nonresident motorist statutes have been enacted in all of the
forty-eight states and the District of Columbia. See Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832, 836-37 (N.D. Iowa 1947). It is clear that
these statutes are being broadly applied to remedy problems
created by new situations. To deny recovery on contractual claims
because of adherence to outmoded fictions, ignores the practical
advahtages of settling all the litigation arising in fact from the
accident and the prevention of a muliplicity of suits.
Donald L. Very

CORPORATIONs-LIABILITY OF OFFICERS FOR TRADEMARK AND
PATENT INFRINGEMENT--AdrmiraL Corp. v. Price Vacuum Stores,

Inc., 141 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. Pa. 1956). Plaintiff brought action
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for an injunction and damages against the corporate defendant
and its officers for the illegal use of its trade name, "Admiral."
The products to which defendant corporation had attached this
name were not identical with those manufactured and sold by
the plaintiff, but were of the same general type-standard household appliances. Defendant president owned fifty-five percent
of the stock in the corporation, was both treasurer and a director
as well as president, and was the one who made the decision to
use the name "Admiral." Held, since the president of the corporation was charged with knowledge of the illegal acts, was
recognized by the managers as having ultimate authority, and
could have stopped the infringement, he was severally liable with
the corporate defendant for damages.
The defendant president had not received any dividends during
the period of infringement, but he had taken a salary and he
was unable to show that it was derived from activities of the
corporation other than those found to be illegal. Consequently
the court computed the percentage of his salary which was
attributable to the infringement, on the basis of the ratio of the
corporation's net sales of "Admiral" products to its total net
sales during the period of infringement, and damages were assessed against him personally in that amount.
In imposing personal liability upon officers of a corporation as a
result of its infringing actions, the courts have followed two
theories. The first imposes personal liability when it is shown
that the officer acted outside the scope of his duties. Art Metal
Works, Inc. v. Henry Lederer & Bro., Inc., 36 F.2d 267 (S.D.N.Y.
1929). The second theory holds an officer liable when he wilfully and knowingly uses the corporation as an instrument to
carry out his deliberate infringment. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation v. Vitamin Technologists, Inc., 41 F. Supp.
857 (S.D. Cal. 1941), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 876 (1945). The
distinction between the two theories is shadowy and elements
of both theories are often present in the same factual situation.
The act of infringement is considered to be a branch of the
broader doctrine of unfair competition. See National Geographic
Soc. v. Classifted Geographic, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 655 (D. Mass.
1939). Officers and directors may be held responsible for the
acts of unfair competition and are therefore properly joined
in an action against the corporation. Willaims Soap Co. v. J. B.
Williams Soap Co., 193 Fed. 384 (7th Cir. 1911), cert. denied,
225 U. S. 712 (1912); Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Loveland, 132 Fed.
41 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1904).
The officer must account for the infringing profits he has
actually received. Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Acetylene Welding Co.,
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259 Fed. 940 (D.N.J. 1916). These profits may be received in
the form of a salary, dividends, or in some other way. The
officer is not, however, liable for profits received by the corporation and either retained by it or distributed to others. Hitchcock
v. American Plate Glass Co., 259 Fed. 948 (3d Cir. 1919).
When the scope of duty test is used as a standard of liability,
the mere serving as an organizer or an officer of a corporation
is not sufficient in itself to impose personal liability. As long
as the officer acts only in his normal capacity no liability ensues,
even though he is indirectly interested and benefits from
the infringing acts of the corporation. The officer is considered
to be the mere agent of the corporation and therefore not
personally liable. Hall's Safe Co. v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe
Co., 146 Fed. 37 (6th Cir. 1906), aff'd, 208 U.S. 554 (1908). Mere
receipt of a salary or commission is not enough to create
personal liability under this theory even where the corporation's
business was derived solely from infringement.
Under the second theory, however, knowledge of the officer
that the corporation is engaging in infringement is the controlling factor which determines personal liability. Liability will
be imposed even if the acts are within the scope of his official
duties. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundationv. Vitamins Technologists, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 857, 871 (S.D. Cal. 1941). Actual
knowledge need not be shown where the officer's position in
the corporation imputes knowledge, General Motors Corp. v.
Provus, 100 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1938), or where it would be
reasonable to assume that infringement was taking place because of the nature of the articles which were being manufactured, Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. American Neon Light Corp.,
39 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1930). This is particularly true in the case
of a close corporation, as in the instant decision, because the infringing acts of the corporation are in effect treated as being
the acts of the officers. See General Electric Co. v- Wabash Appliance Corp., 93 F.2d 671 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 641
(1938).
Where the officer participates in the production or sale of
the infringing articles, liability under the "knowledge" theory
is a necessary result. Moreover, direction and control of subordinates is as blameworthy as personal participation. Saxlehner
v. Eisner,147 Fed. 189 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 203 U.S. 591 (1906).
This supervision may be active or it may result indirectly from
the corporate officer's exercise of his voting power. Claude Neon
Lights, Inc. v. American Neon Light Corp., supra.
In the principal case it could be found that the defendant
corporation's president was personally liable under either of the

19571

RECENT DECISIONS

above theories. However, the court's decision was apparently
based upon the willful and delibrate infringing acts of the
corporation which the president had directed and planned, imputing knowledge of the illegality to him. Both the scope of
duty standard and the willful and deliberate test respect the
separate legal identity of the corporation in theory. The practical
effect of these tests, however, is to disregard the corporation
and to place the liability on the individual who was the sponsor
of the wrong. This result is justified, as it gives the holder of
the trademark or patent a greater opportunity for relief, particularly where the corporation may be judgment-proof, as in
the instant case, and it places primary liability on the guilty
corporate officer. It is submitted that the willful and deliberate
test is the most effective in bringing about this result while the
scope of duty test makes undue concessions in an attempt
to adhere to the corporate identity theory.
James Carroll Booth

CORPORATIONS -

FOREIGN PARENT NOT AMENABLE TO SERVICE

WHERE WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY MAINTAINS SEPARATE IDENTI-

TY.-Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 417
(S.D.N.Y. 1956). Three judgments were returned in a Florida
court against defendant, a Delaware corporation, in suits arising out of a lease taken by its Florida subsidiary. Defendant

had organized a wholly owned subsidiary, incorporated in
Delaware, under the name of Ann Lewis Shops of Tampa, Inc.,
which did business in Florida. Both the parent and the subsidiary
kept separate books and bank accounts. The officers and directors
for both were substantially the same. The parent maintained a central buying service and each subsidiary was charged with its maintenance expense. When defendant-parent did not appear in Florida, it suffered a default judgment upon which plaintiff, assignee
of the original lessor, attempted to recover in New York under the
full faith and credit rule 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1952). The district court
gave judgment for the defendant, on the ground that the Florida
court had no jurisdiction over the defendant. A state cannot obtain
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation merely because such corporation has a wholly owned subsidiary doing business in that
state, if the corporation and subsidiary are kept separate and distinct.
The court cited Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267
U.S. 333 (1925), as controlling. There, under facts much the same
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as the instant case, the Supreme Court said through Mr. Justice
Brandeis that the existence of the subsidiary as a distinct corporate entity was in all respects observed, and therefore the parent
was not present in North Carolina for the purpose of suit in that
.state. Although the soundness of this decision has been questioned,
it has been followed in recent federal cases, at least where the parent corporation has no other contacts with the forum of the subsidiary. See, e.g., Harris v. Deere, 223 F.2d 161 (4th Cir. 1955);
State Street Trust Co. v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 144 F.
Supp. 241. (S.D.N.Y. 1956). The district court concluded that
the Florida court was without jurisdiction to render judgment
against the defendant, since the presence of the Florida subsidiary did not constitute "doing business" by the defendant, within the meaning of the Florida statute providing for fictitious appointment of a state official as agent to receive service upon any
foreign corporation choosing to exercise the privilege extended by
the state to nonresidents to "...

. operate, conduct, engage in, or

carry on a business or business venture, in the state .... ," FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 47.16 (Supp. 1955).
Some support for the plaintiff's contention that the existence of
a subsidiary constitutes "doing business" by the parent can be derived from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945). However, the court refused to apply the International
Shoe standard of "minimum contacts" in the absence of any legislative determination that presence of the subsidiary would render
the parent amenable to suit. The court suggested that the International Shoe doctrine could be followed by the Florida courts in
subsidiary cases only by appropriate legislation, as the question
turned on public policy rather than on constitutional grounds.
Whereas InternationalShoe decided a constitutional question of
due process, holding that the company was present within the
state for service of process under a "minimum contacts" theory,
so that subjecting it to suit would not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice," the Cannon case did not decide the constitutional question, but merely held that defendant
was not present within the state for the purpose of service of process, since the separate identities of both corporations were maintained.
The International Shoe doctrine was affirmed in Traveler's
Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). There, a mail
order insurance company, which had no agents or office within the
state of Virginia, was served with a cease and desist order by the
Virginia Corporation Commission to restrain violation of the
state's "Blue Sky Law." Service of process was effected by registered mail pursuant to statutory provision. The Court upheld this
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substituted service by referring to its prior decisions which had
condemned the injustice of requiring policyholders to seek redress only in another state, and held that the due process clause
did not forbid a state to adopt this means to provide a local forum
for claims against a foreign insurer.
The instant case follows the Cannon rule, and applies to it the
Florida statute on the theory that a parent corporation is not "doing business" in a state where its wholly owned subsidiary is located and "doing business." On the other hand, InternationalShoe
and Traveler's Health decided a basic constitutional issue whether the method employed to render the corporation subject
to local jurisdiction was within the "traditional conception of fair
play and substantial justice"- which logically arises only after
a prior determination that the corporation is subject to local jurisdiction. Therefore, in the. absence of an appropriate statute, the
Cannonrule prevails on precedent alone when the facts are similar
to those in the instant case.
The case of Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), decided
eighteen years prior to International Shoe, serves to support the
policy assertions in InternationalShoe and Traveler's Health. The
statute in that case established a fictitious appointment of a state
official to receive process for a non-resident motorist and was most
certainly enacted pursuant to the policy of providing a local forum
to facilitate the enforcement of claims against non-residents.
Using this policy as a basis, a state could enact a statute which
would enable a local citizen to serve a foreign corporation with
process and thereby acquire jurisdiction over it, through its subsidiary. Such a statute would appear to satisfy the due process
requirement, since the presence of a subsidiary would go beyond
the "minimum contacts" standard of the InternationalShoe and
Traveler's Health cases.
The statute might read:
Any corporation which conducts business within this state
through a wholly-owned subsidiary or through a subsidiary of
which it owns at least a majority of the stock, regardless of the fact
that both corporations maintain separate corporate identities, shall
be deemed, by such operations, to have voluntarily agreed to subject itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for the service of process in any action brought against it, which arises from
the conduct of such business by its subsidiary.
This statute would effectively discard the separate entity fiction
found in the Cannon case and in the instant case. Separate identities would not render the parent immune to service of process,
since by creating the subsidiary in a state where the proposed statute is enacted, the parent would voluntarily waive any immunity
afforded it by the Cannon decision, and would agree to subject
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itself to the jurisdiction of the state in order that service of process
might be made upon it in any action brought against it arising out
of the conduct of the business by its subsidiary within the state. In
the absence of such statute, however, the International Shoe doc-

trine logically is not brought into play.
The federal courts have frequently stated their dislike for the
rule in the Cannon case; see the instant case and Harrisv. Deere
& Co., supra; but they have stated that they were not at liberty to
disregard the ruling. It would appear that the courts are bound
to follow this doctrine until rescued by legislation or by Supreme
Court overthrow of the Cannon decision.

William E. Coyle

U.S. ARBITRATION ACT APPLICLABOR LAW ARBITRATION ABLE TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. - Signal-Stat Corp.

v. Local 475, United Electrical Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.
1956), petition for cert. filed, 25 U.S.L. WEEK 3128 (U.S. Oct. 20,
1956) (No. 520). Plaintiff, a manufacturer of goods for interstate
commerce, brought suit for breach of contract under § 301 (a)
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 185 (1952), alleging that defendant union had violated
the no-strike clause in their collective bargaining agreement when
it called a strike and sitdown of production employees. Defendant
moved for a stay of the action pending arbitration of the dispute
as provided for in their agreement. The district court's denial of
the stay was appealed, the defendant contending that it was
entitled to a stay under the provisions of the United States
Arbitration Act, 61 STAT. 669 (1947), 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1952), or
under section 301 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act. The circuit court
reversed, finding the Arbitration Act applicable because the employees were not actually engaged in interstate commerce within
the meaning of the exclusionary clause of section one of the act,
although they manufactured goods for interstate commerce;
therefore, the defendant was entitled to a stay under section three
of that act. The United States Aribitration Act applies to collective bargaining agreements of employees engaged in manufacturing goods for interstate commerce as distinguished from those
engaged in the actual transporting processes of interstate
commerce.
The Supreme Court has yet to interpret section one of the
Arbitration Act, which excludes "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
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in foreign or interstate commerce" from the provisions of the
act. Until it does so, the decisions of the lower federal courts will
continue to remain in conflict. Even though these courts approach
the question in the same manner, ie., by determining whether
or not the collective bargaining agreement is within the exclusionary clause of section one, their decisions vary as to whether they
should grant a stay under section three, which provides for the
issuance of a stay, pending arbitration in".. . . any suit or proceeding. ..brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any
issue referable to arbitration ......
The Fourth Circuit has held that the provisions of the Arbitration Act may not be applied to a collective bargaining agreement
since it is a contract relating to the employment of workers
engaged in interstate commerce within the clear meaning of the
exclusion clause contained in the first section. International
FurnitureWorkers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F.2d
33 (4th Cir. 1948). In refusing to grant a stay as provided for in
section three, the court decided that the clear intention of
Congress was to have the exclusion clause apply not only to the
first section but to the act in its entirety. Subsequently, in United
Electrical Workers v. Miller Metal Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 221
(4th Cir. 1954), the court re-affirmed its position when called
upon to overrule the Colonial Hardwood case in view of the
distinction drawn between contracts of employment and collective
bargaining agreements in J. L Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332
(1944).
Recently the Fifth Circuit, after considering the diverse interpretations of the Arbitration Act, followed the reasoning of
the Fourth Circuit and held that the collective bargaining contract
was excluded from enforcement by section one of the act. Lincoln
Mills v. Textile Workers Union, CIO, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956),
cert. granted, 25 U.S.L. WEEK 3104 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1956) (No. 211).
Earlier the Tenth Circuit, relying on International Furniture
Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., supra, also reached
this conclusion. Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers International Union, CIO, 187 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1951) (dictum).
However, the First Circuit in Local 205, United Electrical
Workers v. General Electric Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956),
cert. granted,25 U.S.L. WEEK 3104 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1956) (No. 276),
and the Sixth Circuit in Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Local 327,
Teamsters Union, AFL, 217 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1954), found
similar collective bargaining agreements not to be "contracts of
employment" within the meaning of section one, and stays
were granted as provided for in section three. Both courts adhered
to the dictum of J.1. Case Co. v. NLRB, supra, which stated that
the end product of negotiations between the employer and the
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union is not a contract of employment, but rather a trade agreement. However, since that case was not concerned with the
interpretation of the Arbitration Act, these two decisions do not
appear to be warranted in so far as they extract that dictum from
its proper context and subscribe to it when confronted with the
problem of interpreting section one.
The Third Circuit determined that a collective bargaining
agreement is a "contract of employment" within the meaning
of section one, but held the Arbitration Act applicable, and
granted a stay, on another ground, interpreting the exclusionary
clause of section one as being applicable only to those workers
who are actually engaged in the transportation industries and
therefore not to those who merely produce goods for interstate
commerce. Tenney Engineering Inc. v. Local 437, United Electrical Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953). In the instant case,
the Second Circuit, while adopting this reasoning and decision
of the Third Circuit, was influenced also by its earlier implied
holding that a collective bargaining agreement constituted a
"contract of employment." Shirley-Herman Co. v. Local 210, InternationalHod CarriersUnion, 182 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1950)
(dictum). Obviously these two courts were sympathetic toward
the present almost universal approval of arbitration as a means
for settling labor disputes and maintaining industrial peace. See
Kaye and Allen, Union Responsibility and Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 30 B.U.L. REv. 1, 22-30 (1950).
They had to tread a narrow path if a result favorable to this end
was to be reached. To give such a strict interpretation to the
Arbitration Act in order to achieve this desirable goal does not
appear necessary, however, when the same goal could have been
attained under section 301 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Although the court in the instant case found section three of
the Arbitration Act applicable, it did not reach the question
whether the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement would be enforceable under section 301 (a) of the TaftHartley Act. Yet federal courts have permitted specific enforcement of arbitration agreements in collective bargaining contracts
under authority of this section. Wilson Brothers v. Textile Workers Union, CIO, 132 F. Supp. 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), appeal dismissed, 224 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834
(1955); Textile Workers Union, CIO v. American Thread Co.,
113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953) (critized and in effect overruled
by Local 205, United Electrical Workers v. General Electric Co.,
supra). Contra, Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union, CIO,
supra. While both the Arbitration Act and section 301 (a) of the
Taft-Hartley Act may be used as a means of requiring the parties
to proceed to arbitration, it is suggested that section 301 (a) is the
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more practical at present in view of the existing conflict among
the federal courts when called upon to interpret section one of
the Arbitration Act. Certainly the declaration of national policy
contained in section 201 of the Taft-Hartley Act favors arbitration,
thus supporting the right to specific enforcement of arbitration
agreements in collective bargarining contracts under the provisions of section 301 (a) of that act.
Edward N. Denn

TORTS-LIBEL--ACCUSATION OF PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNIST
INDUSTRY.-Julian v. Ameri-

INFILTRATION OF COMM.UNICATIONS

can Business Consultants, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 1, 137 N.E.2d 1 (1956).
Defendant's booklet Red Channels, published in 1950, was allegedly an attempt to alert the American people to the Communist "plan of infiltration of the radio and television industry."
Defendant listed the occasions upon whioh performers associated themselves with "organizations espousing Communist
causes." Plaintiff was among the performers listed. Plaintiff
admitted having attended the meetings of two such organizations
as reported by defendant. Conceding the truth of defendant's
listings, plaintiff brought this libel suit alleging that defendant
unjustifiably conferred upon plaintiff the opprobrium of Communist affiliation. Plaintiff alleged further that such degradation
in the public esteem severely circumscribed his employment
opportunities and generally resulted in social ostracism. Defendant set up the defense of fair comment based upon the
right to criticize (a) the activities of a public performer, and (b)
anyone who undertakes to comment publicly on political matters.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, 131 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup.
Ct. 1956), and the appellate division unanimously affirmed, 285
App. Div. 944, 139 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1st Dep't 1956). The court of
appeals reviewed the decisions below and affirmed, two justices
dissenting.
Hays v. American Defense Soc'y, Inc., 252 N.Y. 266, 169 N.E.
380 (1929), was cited by the majority in the instant case as
the controlling precedent for its decision. In the Hays case the
same New York court held that listing of plaintiff's name
as one of 396 named directors of an organization indirectly connected with a group which aided the Communist party was not
sufficient to sustain a charge of libel. The focal problem presented
in Hays as well as in the instant case is that of ascertaining
whether an allegedly libelous statement about an entire group is
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sufficiently personal to a given individual within the group to be
"of and concerning" him so that he individually has been libeled.
The law of group libel focuses upon the size of the group and
the probability of individual identification. If the group is small
enough so that a person reading the defamatory statement can
readily identify the plaintiff as one of the group, then the
plaintiff has a cause of action. Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D.
311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (the four members of a sales personnel
force). However, if the group is large enough to preclude individual identification, the plaintiff has not been defamed. Latimer
v. Chicago Daily News Inc., 330 m. App. 295, 71 N.E.2d 553 (1947)
(a group of twenty-three lawyers). Where the plaintiff is part
of a group mentioned in the allegedly defamatory statement, he
"must first of all show that he is in fact a member of the class
defamed. Beyond this, he must establish some reasonable
personal application of the words to himself." PRossER, TORTS §
92, p. 583 (2d ed. 1955).
In the Hays decision, plaintiff was but one of 396 persons
about whom the allegedly defamatory statements were made;
in the instant case .plaintiff was but one of 151 such persons. On
both occasions the court held that the plaintiff had failed to
establish sufficient personal application of the allegedly defamatory statement. Under the ordinary group libel test, such
a conclusion is correct enough. There is, however, an element
present in both cases which warrants treatment apart from the
group libel: over and above any reference to a group, there also
was a listing of individuals, and thereby a singling out of the
plaintiff as specific person.
If the language in the instant case be found to apply to the
plaintiff in his individual person, there would seem to be little
doubt that it was defamatory in character, since it allegedly
consisted of a characterization of the plaintiff as a Communist
tool, dupe, and sympathizer. Such a gravamen finds sustenance
in the concern which the various state and federal courts have
shown in situations of Communist accusation. In the day of
emerging Communism, the label of "Red" was deemed "capable
of being used to designate a person believing in disobedience to
the laws of his country and intent upon forcibly seizing and appropriating the property of others", and if so understood would
be libelous per se. Toomey v. Jones, 124 Okla. 167, 254 Pac. 736,
737-38 (1926). In the present era of Communism, an accusation
of Communist membership constitutes libel per se, "because the
label of 'Communist' today in the minds of many average and
respectable persons places the accused beyond the pale of
respectability and makes him a symbol of public hatred ...
Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 1947).

1957]

RECENT DECISIONS

Nor does it matter that the accusation is one of mere association
and sympathy rather than of actual membership, for "any difference is one of degree only .

. ."

Grant v. Readers Digest

Ass'n Inc., 151 F.2d 733, 735 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
797 (1946). See also, Utah State Farm Bureau Federation v.
NationalFarmersUnion Service Corp., 198 F.2d (10th Cir. 1952);
Ward v. League for Justice, 93 N.E.2d 723 (Ohio 1950).
The Hays case was not the sole precedent for the instant case.
A contrary result was reached in Derounianv. Stokes, 168 F.2d
305 (10th Cir. 1948), where the defendant was the author of a
book which purported to expose pro-Fascist elements in the
United States. Despite the fact that, as in the instant case, the
plaintiff was not specifically accused of disloyalty, the references
to the plaintiff when read in connection with the entire book, and
in view of the state of public opinion at the time of publication,
were such as to convey connotations of disloyalty and consequently were libelous per se. Also, in a prior New York decision,
Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E.2d 257 (1947), the
libelous character of imputations of Communist association was
recognized and the question of actual defamation submitted to
the jury. Despite the distinguishing features of the latter casedirect reference to the plaintiff, and absence of an issue of fair
comment-it is submitted that the procedure followed in that
decision was far more equitable than that of the instant case,
for the issue of defamation was answered by those to whom the
words in question were addressed.
In deciding as a matter of law that no defamation existed in
the publication in the instant case, the majority failed to assess
properly the temper of the times. The court underestimated the
impact upon the public of defendant's purported expose of
political intrigue in the entertainment industry, and failed to
consider properly the reverence of the reading public for the
printed word. The net result is to permit a publisher to "brand
his victims with suspicion and then avoid liability by attempting
to foist upon the reader the burden and responsibility of ascertaining whether or not there is anything to the charge." Julian
v. American Business Consultants, Inc., supra,dissenting opinion
at 23.
William C. Rindone, Jr.

TORTs - PRENATAL INJURIES - CAUSE OF AcTIoN ARISES ANY
TIME AFTER CoNCEPTION.-Hornbuckle v.PlantationPipeLine Co.,
212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956). Plaintiff, an infant, instituted
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this suit to recover for prenatal injuries allegedly sustained when
defendant's automobile struck the car in which plaintiff's mother,
then pregnant for about six weeks, was riding. The injuries resulted in deformities of the right foot, ankle and leg. The trial court,
having overruled a general demurrer to the complaint, was reversed by the court of appeals, PlantationPipe Line Co. v. Hornbuckle, 93 Ga. App. 391, 91 S.E.2d 773 (1956), on the ground that
no cause of action accrues to a child for tortious injuries sustained
as an embryo or foetus "not quick in its mother's womb." 91 S.E.2d
at 774. On certiorari, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed. An
infant has a right to recover for injuries inflicted "at any period of
its prenatal life," if it can properly prove causation, for in matters
beneficial to a child, it is to be regarded as a person in being from
the moment of its conception.
This ruling is the first categorical pronouncement on the part of
a court of final jurisdiction that injuries to an embryo are compensable. Only one other court, one of intermediate jurisdiction, professed such a liberal view on the issue of recovery for prenatal injuries. Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y. Supp. 696
(3d Dep't 1953). In that case plaintiff's mother was in the third
month of pregnancy when the injury occurred.
The question as to whether an infant may maintain an action
founded on injuries sustained by the child during its prenatal
existence received a negative answer in Dietrich v. Northampton,
138 Mass. 14 (1884), where the question first arose. For
some time after this decision in the majority of jurisdictions
where the issue subsequently was raised the courts arrived
at the same conclusion. Buel v. United Railways Co., 248 Mo. 126,
154 S.W. 71 (1913); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567
(1921); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 Atl. 704 (1901). See
10 A.L.R.2d 1059 (1950). Reasons cited to justify this harsh doctrine were lack of precedent for such a cause of action, Allaire v.
St. Luke's Hospital, 184 l. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); belief that
the child, not being a separate entity apart from the mother, was
not a human person in esse to whom the tortfeasor owed a duty to
exercise reasonable care, Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,
214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926); and apprehension that a ruling
permitting recovery would lead to fraudulent claims, since it
would be difficult to establish causation between a prenatal injury
and a postnatal handicap, MagnoliaCoca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935). See Bliss v. Passanesi,
326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E.2d 206 (1950), for a reaffirmance, although
a reluctant one, of the grounds for non-recovery.
However, the Canadian Supreme Court in Montreal Tramways
v. Leveille, [1933] Can. Sup. Ct. 456, 4 D.L.R. 337, held that a
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child could recover for injuries sustained by the child as a foetus
of seven months. Although this case was decided in accordance with
the civil law, it exerted great influence on the American courts and
by 1953 the American weight of authority had shifted to a rule
granting such a cause of action. Amann v. Faidy, 415 IMI. 422, 114
N.E.2d 412 (1953); Steggal v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d
577 (1953). See Note, 39 CORNELL L. Q. 542, 543 n.6 (1954). But,
with the exception of Kelly v. Gregory, supra, and the instant case,
the decisions in which a child is accorded a right to recover confine
their holding to viable foeti. A viable foetus is defined as one that
"has reached such a stage of development, that it can live outside
of the uterus." DoRLAiN, AmmIcAN ILLUsTRATED MEDIcAL DicTIONARY (22d ed. 1951). See also Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital,
supra, at 642.
The arguments, notably the argument by analogy to other
branches of the law, advanced in favor of permitting a right of
action in cases where prenatal injuries occurred to viable foeti are,
however, equally applicable to cases of nonviable foeti and embryos sustaining injuries. Indeed they have been utilized in both
Kelly v. Gregory, supra, and the instant case.
It is a well established principle that in the law of property, especially in matters of descent and inheritance, unborn children,
irrespective of whether or not they are viable, are considered as
in esse from the time of conception, whenever it would be advan-

tageous for the infants to be so considered. See 1

BLACKSTONE,

ComnWENTAmRs 130 (Lewis ed. 1897). The permissible period allowed by the Rule against Perpetuities includes the entire period
of gestation. See Thelluson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. Jr. 322, 31 Eng.
Rep. 117 (Ch. 1798). In Quinlen v. Welch, 69 Hun 584 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Gen. T. 1893), the court held an infant could bring an action for
the wrongful death of his parent occurring at any time during the
period of gestation.
The Georgia Supreme Court, in holding that a child could recover for her prenatal injury suffered while her mother was on
the way to the hospital for delivery, stated in Tucker v. Howard L.
Carmichael& Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 at 911 (1951), that it
a... would be illogical, unrealistic, and unjust - both to child and
society -for the law to withhold its processes necessary for the
protection of persons of an unborn child, while, at the same time,
making such processes available for purposes of protecting its
property."
As to the argument that fictitious claims will arise because it is
difficult to prove causation between a prenatal injury and a postnatal condition, in Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d
550 at 559 (1951), the right to institute a suit was clearly distin-
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guished from the ability to prove the facts: "The first cannot be
denied because the second may not exist." The view that uncertainty of proof can destroy a legal right was termed an erroneous
concept in Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 at 143 (D.D.C. 1946). Although the difficulties of proper proof are much greater if the injury was received in an early .stage of gestation, this should not
impair the principle involved. The courts and textwriters have
been confident that the "rules of evidence are adequate to require
satisfactory proof" of prenatal injury. Montreal Tramways v.
Leveille, supra, at 346 (there the problem was to trace the cause
of clubfeet to a prenatal injury and on appeal the court was satisfied that it had properly been done); PROSSER, TORTS, 174 (2d ed.
1955); Gamble, Tort Actions for Injuries to Unborn Infants, 3
VAND L. REv. 282, 289-92 (1950). On the contrary, " ...the difficulty of obtaining proof of the wrong should prompt greater
leniency in affording the remedy, rather than a denial of plain
justice." Scott v. McPheeters,33 Cal. App.2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 at
682 (1939).
Finally, the refutation of the argument that an unborn child is
pars viscerum matris until birth and hence not a person in being
to whom an action for prenatal injuries could accrue, can also be
extended to embryos and non-viable foeti- not only to viable
foeti -on the basis of medical and physiological facts. Medical
science has demonstrated that not only a viable foetus but also an
embryo and a non-viable foetus have an independent existence
from the moment of conception. GREisnwER, PHYSIOLOGY AND
ANATOmY, 738 (5th ed. 1945). See Bonbrest v. Kotz, supra, at 140,

for other medical authorities. It is a matter of elementary physiology that a mother and her child in utero are two separate and distinct entities with separate circulatory systems without any communication between them, and with different heartbeats, that of
the child being faster. The child, in other words, is not a constituent part of the mother, but rather lives with her. Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa.D.&C. 227, 228 (1924), later overruled by Berlin v. J. C.
Penny Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940) ; Stemmer v. Kline, 128
N.J.L. 455, 25 A.2d 489, 685 (1942) (dissent). In Kelly v. Gregory,
supra at 697, the court, discussing the difficulty of fixing the point
of legal separability from the mother, stated:
. . . legal separability should begin where there is biological
separability. We know something more of the actual process of
conception and foetal development now than when some of the
common law cases were decided; and what we know makes it
possible to demonstrate clearly that separability begins at conception. (Emphasis added.)

The principle enunciated in Kelly v. Gregory, supra, and the
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instant case, obviates the difficulties as to when the viability stage
is reached. There is no certainty as to when a child becomes viable;
it may be at any time from six to eight months. Cooper v. Blanck,
39 So.2d 352, 355 (La. 1923). The concept of viability in the law
governing prenatal injuries with its distinction between viable and
non-viable foeti, on the basis of which the right to recover is either
accorded or denied, still leaves a large area in which there is no
relief for tortious injuries. In a case where a non-viable foetus of
six months has been injured, denial of its right to bring an action
would be purely arbitrary.
Another possible point of legal separability as alluded to by way
of dicta in the Damasiewicz case, supra at 559, and the Tucker
case, supra at 910, is the moment when the child quickens in the
mother's womb, i.e. when the mother first feels its movements,
which is normally between the fourth and fifth month. But such
a theory would also be unsatisfactory: first, because the mother
would be the only person who could testify as to when the child
becomes "quick" and this could easily increase the danger of fraudulent claims; and secondly, there is still a period during which
injury could be inflicted with impunity.
It is submitted that the rationale of the instant case which gives
the child a right of action from the time of conception, removes the
injustice of an injury without compensation.
Karl Jorda

